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The evolving role of the board of directors' in governing
American corporate life 2 has been an issue of substantial legal
comment in recent years. 3 The heightened interest in corporate
board activity is largely attributable to the ongoing and often
fierce debate concerning the degree of independence corporate
executives should enjoy in charting the course and establishing
the goals of the corporation in our society.4 A host of critics,
composing what is now generally referred to as the "corporate
* Assistant Professor, Bloomsburg University, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. J.D.,
University of Georgia.
I Although the general term "director" is frequently used in this article, the
primary focus of this work is upon the outside director and the problems created by
his increased legal liability. The outside director is one who does not serve in a
managerial capacity and who is "unaffiliated" and "independent" of the corporation. Hahn & Manzoni, The Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors'EvolvingDuty of
Care, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 587, 592 (1978). One serving as an executive or in any
other employment capacity with the corporation would be deemed an inside director. The same would be true of the corporation's lawyer or banker. Id.; see also
Cohen, The Outside Director - Selection, Responsibilities, and Contribution to the Public
Corporation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 837, 837 (1977); Shipman, Role of Outside Distinguishedfrom That of Inside Director, in DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DiRECTORS 47-48 (A. Cohen & R. Loeb eds. 1978).
2 See Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353 (1979). See generally CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND
REFORM (D. DeMott ed. 1980).
3 See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975); Greenough &
Clapman, The Role of Independent Directors in Corporate Governance, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 916 (1981); Schwartz, Response: Some Thoughts on the Directors' Evolving Role, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1405 (1979). See generally Marcus & Walters, Assault on Managerial
Autonomy, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 57 (providing overview of various
significant proposals for corporate reform, including utilization of corporate board
as vehicle for renovation).
4 Compare Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982) (denying existence of any problem and supporting present corporate form)
and Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations:A Contractualand Private Property Model, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979) (justifying traditional corporate structure as most economically efficient model) with Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1977) (advocating greater directorial responsibility for monitoring corporate behavior) and Eisenberg, supra note 3 (calling for changes in corporate law to enhance
oversight function of board of directors).
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governance movement," ' 5 have addressed this issue. They depict
the American corporation as an institution of overwhelming economic power that historically has been unwilling to compromise
its singular goal of profit maximization to pursue other, socially
beneficial objectives.6 In concert with this criticism, many in the
governance movement assert that the traditional corporate legal
framework has permitted management free rein to guide this
business entity in its societal sojourn, insulated from the concerns of shareholders and unchecked by the board of directors. 7
In assessing the alleged impotence of the director in shaping
corporate policy, some critics attribute much of the blame to the
traditional low standard of legal care imposed upon board members.8 In addition, they maintain that directors generally serve
upon the recommendation and at the pleasure of management. 9
By virtue of this symbiotic relationship the director is rendered
incapable of either objectively assessing the performance of a
corporate officer or offering a meaningful voice in determining
5 The term "corporate governance movement" refers generally to a number of
legal commentators who are sharply critical of the present corporate structure.
They urge a revision of traditional legal standards in order to enhance corporate
social responsibility and subject the corporation to greater shareholder and/or directorial control. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 4; Schwartz, Towards New Corporate
Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 Geo. L.J. 57 (1971); see also R. NADER, M. GREEN &
J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). See generally COMMENTARIES
ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979) (survey of reform proposals to alter internal governance of
large corporations). The proponents of this movement propose a number of divergent methods for bringing about corporate reform, including Federal chartering of
corporations, Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); inclusion of a mandatory number of
outside directors on the board, Williams, Corporate Accountability, in COMMENTARIES
ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 19771978, at 513, 520 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); requiring the inclusion of a public interest director on the board, Townsend, A Modest Proposal. The Public Director, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 257 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); and providing
board members with independent staffs for monitoring management, Vagts, The
Governance of the Corporation: Reality and Law, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978, at 159-62 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979).
6 It should be noted that there is by no means uniform acceptance of the premise that a corporation should voluntarily pursue goals other than profit maximization. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 186-87 (1972) (noting economic
inefficiency of corporate pursuits of "social goals").
7 See, e.g., Jones, CorporateGovernance.- Who Controls the Large Corporation?,30 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1280-81 (1979).
8 E.g., Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct Under the Common Law, PresentDay Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61, 61 (1972).
9 See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971), cited in Marcus & Walters,
supra note 3, at 63 & n.10.
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which goals the entity shall pursue.'"
In seeking to curb the exclusive powers of corporate management and thereby to direct the corporation towards enhanced
social responsibility, many within the governance movement advocate reconstituting boards to include a mandatory number of
outside directors." They regard the role of the outside director
in ushering in corporate reform as twofold: (1) the board member who is not a member of management can exercise greater
independence and power in his role as overseer of managerial
performance, and (2) the outside director can expand the vision
of the corporation beyond maximization of profits and
interject
2
diverse social values into the life of the corporation.'
The academic debate over the proper role of the director in
corporate governance has assumed relevance and urgency in
light of the contemporaneously evolving tendency to hold the director personally liable for corporate mismanagement and violations of law by the corporate entity.' 3 The director, once shielded
from legal action arising from his breach of duties except in the
most egregious of cases, now finds himself more frequently
targeted as an appropriate defendant in an array of corporaterelated lawsuits alleging mismanagement, securities fraud, and
antitrust violations." Two ramifications flow from this increased
exposure: the corporate investment in director and officer insurance coverage has risen at a dramatic rate,' 5 and, what is of even
10 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 381.
11 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5, at 520.

Id. at 521.
The numerous shareholder lawsuits filed against corporate directors in the
aftermath of the Penn Central bankruptcy of 1974 have been cited as ushering in a
new era of director liability. See End of the Director'sRubber Stamp, Bus. WK., Sept. 10,
1979, at 72 [hereinafter cited as Rubber Stamp]. Claims against corporate directors
rose 300% in the five-year period following the settlement of the Penn Central
lawsuits. Id. at 73.
14 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(filing false statements in violation of section 11 of 1933 Securities Act); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (failure to prevent misappropriation of trust funds); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224
A.2d 634 (1966) (negligent waste of corporate assets resulting in insolvency).
15 In a five-year period, the number of "top 1000" corporations carrying director and officer insurance rose from approximately 60% to 95%. Rubber Stamp, supra
note 13, at 73.
The conditions under which a board member can be indemnified for personal
liabilities incurred as a result of permitting or participating in corporate violations
of existing environmental protection laws, and the extent to which such liabilities
can be insured against, are issues of vital concern for the corporate director. See
Committee on Business Management Liab. Ins., Liability Insurance Against Environmental Damages, 38 Bus. LAw. 217, 233-35 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Liability Insur12
13
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greater concern, many responsible and valued members of the
business community are increasingly reluctant to serve on the
16
boards of major corporations.
Coinciding with the aforementioned debates over the director's role in corporate governance and the trend towards his increased legal liability, the sudden emergence and rapid growth of
the environmental movement 17 has added a new dimension to
the problem. The quest for preservation of an ecological balance
has resulted in a flood of environmental legislation on both the
Federal and state levels.' 8 Because Federal enactments are based
on a deterrence system, those persons implicated in violations
face significant civil and criminal liability. 19 The extent to which
20
this will affect corporate directors is still uncertain.
ance]. For a general discussion of a director's right to liability insurance and
indemnification, see W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 19.01-20.22 (3d ed. 1978). Presently, all United States jurisdictions provide for some type of corporate indemnification of officers, directors, and other
agents. Statutes vary from state to state, however. For discussions of the policy
considerations underlying representative enactments, see Irenas & Moskowitz, Indemnification of CorporateOfficers, Agents, and Directors: Statutory Mandates and Policy Limitations, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117 (1984); Comment, Corporate Indemnification: A
View from the Director's Chair, 27 LoYoLA L. REV. 89 (1981).
16 See Conrad, BehavioralAnalysis of Directors' Liabilityfor Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J.
895, 903 (1972); Goldschmid, The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections on Corporate
Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 15, 21-24 (1973); Mace, What Today's
Directors Worry About, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1978, at 30; Sloate, Outside Corporate Directors: Will Increasing Liability Send Them Running Out of Board Rooms?, 48 N.J.
St.J. 618 (1976).
17 See W. DOUGLAS, THE THREE HUNDRED YEAR WAR (1972); L. WENNER, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982); Muskie, An Environmental Programfor
America, 1 ENVrL. L. 2 (1970).
18 Federal enactments include: Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972, 7 U.S.C. § 13 6 -y (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 26012629 (1982); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982);
Air Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). Representative state environmental statutes are CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a (West 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6030 (1974 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 299.501-.551 (West 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11a to -23.112 (West
1974).
19 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1)(b) (1982) (civil
liability up to $25,000 for each violation; criminal liability of $25,000 per day
and/or one year imprisonment); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c),
(d) (1982) (criminal penalties of $2,500-$25,000 per day and/or one year imprisonment for first offense; $50,000 and/or two years imprisonment for subsequent offenses; civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (g) (1982) ($25,000 fine and/or one year imprisonment for each violation; $50,000 and/or two years imprisonment for intentional violations; civil liability of up to $25,000 for each violation).
20 Both the corporation and an individual director may be liable for violations of
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The confluence of these trends raises issues of utmost importance in structuring the future of the corporation in American
society. It also provides a microcosm for examining the appropriate role of the outside director in corporate management and
the economic consequences of his enhanced legal duties and liabilities. 2 ' Accordingly, this article will examine the potential legal
liability of the outside director as a consequence of Federal environmental legislation.2 2 Thereafter, conclusions will be drawn
environmental laws. For example, the Clean Water Act, provides for criminal and
civil sanctions against "any person" violating sections 1311 through 1318 of the
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1982). "Person" is defined to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, state, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State or any interstate body." Id. § 1362(5). The Solid Waste
Disposal Act similarly defines "person" to include the corporation, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15) (1982), as does the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1982). See also
Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1292 (8th Cir. 1976) (corporation
regarded as " 'person in charge' " and consequently subject to criminal liability
under Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976)); United States
v. Haney Chevrolet, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (corporation held liable under Clean Air Act for illegal acts of service manager and mechanic on theory
of respondeat superior).
The corporation clearly is subject to criminal and civil liability for environmental violations, and there are recent indications that the corporate officer may be a
viable target for the imposition of independent civil liability. In United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), the
United States brought an action against a chemical manufacturing company and
several of its officers for violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a), 9607(a) (1983). Northeastern, 579 F. Supp. at 826. Although the court acknowledged that "corporate officers are normally not personally liable for acts of the corporate entity," id. at 847,
liability was nevertheless imposed upon the corporation's vice president. Id. at 849.
The court observed that the corporate officer had actual knowledge of the hazardous waste and had supervised its disposal. Id. at 847. Finally, the court noted that
the vice president constituted a " 'person' " as that term is used in the Act. Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21)). But cf. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1976) ("A corporate officer may not be held civilly
liable for a corporate violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act unless either the Act
itself authorizes such liability, or there are sufficient allegations and proof to permit
negation of the corporate form."); Exquisite Form Indus., Inc. v. Transportes
Ragat, 585 F. Supp. 473, 475-76 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (corporate officers, as agents for
company, shielded from personal liability for damages caused by leaking drums);
West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 585 (W.D. Va. 1983) ("An officer of a corporation cannot be held personally liable for the wrongful conduct of the corporation's
employees absent personal involvement with the conduct.").
21 See Shipman, supra note 1, at 47-48.
22 A director may face personal liability for his corporation's violation of environmental law from several sources. For example, it may be imposed by virtue of
the civil and criminal sanctions accompanying many of the Federal environmental
statutes. See supra note 19 (examples of kinds of penalties which these statutes impose); Liability Insurance, supra note 15, at 231-32; see also Committee on Envtl. Controls, Air and Water Enforcement Problems - A Case Study, 34 Bus. LAw. 665 (1979)
(regulatory framework of Clean Air and Clean Water Acts); LaForce, White-Collar
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concerning the most effective role for the outside director in corCrime, Environmental Crimes, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 345, 345-70 (1981) (criminal sanctions under Clean Water, Refuse, and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Acts); Taylor, Civil Penalties in Environmental Enforcement, reprinted in ABA,
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: SELECTED READINGS (1979) (civil liability for envi-

ronmental infractions). In addition, a separate ground of liability exists under Federal securities law. See Liability Insurance, supra note 15, at 233. The comprehensive
scope of the Federal environmental law scheme and its multifaceted impact upon
the corporation, when juxtaposed with Federal securities law, suggests that the
prospects of director liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77(k) (1982), is of great consequence. For a delineation of a director's
duty of diligence under section 11, see Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp.
643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The SEC has also issued a series of releases which
attempt to delineate the environmental impact information which the corporation
must disclose in securities reporting documents. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Release No. 17762 (May 4, 1981); Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6315
(May 4, 1981); see also French, Advising the CorporateClient on Environmental Compliance,
reprinted in P.L.I. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 123, 449 (1981).

The most likely vehicle for imposing personal liability on the director for his
corporation's infraction of environmental law is the shareholder's derivative suit.
See Liability Insurance, supra note 15, at 233. In such an action, the corporate director
could be a named defendant based upon his active or passive participation in corporate violations of environmental statutes and the company's liability flowing
therefrom. Id.
Several factors, however, mitigate against the success of derivative suits. Prior
to filing a derivative lawsuit, the shareholder is generally required to demand that
the board undertake litigation, unless such a request could be considered futile.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984). See generally Note, Demand on
Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746
(1960); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirement in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168 (1976). Moreover, Federal or state law may require a
demand on shareholders as a prerequisite to the filing of the derivative suit. See
Comment, supra, at 182. These demand requirements act as a limitation on the
power of the shareholder to initiate litigation independently on behalf of the corporation. See Dent, The Power of Directorsto Terminate ShareholdersLitigation: The Death of
the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 97 & n.5 (1980). Furthermore, in recent
years, courts have recognized the power of special corporate litigation committees
to dismiss derivative litigation directed against members of the corporate board.
See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Elfin, An Evaluation of a New
Trend in Corporate Law: Dismissalof Derivative Suits by Minority Board Committees, 20 A.
Bus. L.J. 179 (1982); Estes, Corporate Governance in the Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REV.
July-Aug. 1980, at 50. A large body of legal literature has developed which addresses the degree of power which the corporate board should enjoy in terminating
deiivative litigation when board members are named as defendants. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr. & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 323 (1981); Duesenberg, The Business
Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q
311, 337-41 (1982).
Legal commentators have questioned the ability of the special litigation committee to determine objectively whether derivative litigation directed against a majority of fellow board members should be dismissed. See Dent, supra, at 112-14. But
see Duesenberg, supra, at 335. Some legal authors have suggested that directors
composing a litigation committee will be prone towards affording undue protection
to fellow board members who are targeted by the derivative lawsuit. Cox, Searching
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porate management and the extent to which liability should be
imposed upon the outside board member for corporate-related
pollution violations.

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF DIRECTORIAL DUTIES

State law generally defines the board of directors as the body
that controls and is responsible for corporate management. 2 3
While entrusting the corporation's management to the board,
corporate laws within the various states provide for liberal delegation of managerial powers to corporate officers, leaving the
board to function as overseer of proposed corporate activity.2 4
American jurisprudence during the early decades of the twentieth century mandated, with regard to actual participation in management of the corporation, that the board of directors adopt a
"laissez faire" attitude. Learned Hand summarized the director's
relationship to management in the following terms: "While difor the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation, A Critique of Zapata and the ALI
Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962. One means for remedying this alleged defect in
the special litigation committee is to empower reviewing courts to engage in an
independent business determination of whether the derivative litigation should be
dismissed. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787-89. For a comprehensive discussion of the
role of the judiciary in reviewing a litigation committee's motion for termination,
see Dent, supra. But cf. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 938-39 (1982) (litigation committee's dismissal of derivative litigation should be sheltered from independent judicial review by business judgment rule). At least one commentator
suggests that the special litigation committee could spell the death of the derivative
lawsuit as a vehicle for maintaining corporate integrity. Dent, supra, at 109.
23 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); see MODEL BUSINESS

CORP. ACT § 35 (1982).
24 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1982) ("All corporate powers shall be

exercised by or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall
be managed under the direction of, a board of directors .. ") (emphasis added);
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.01, 3.02(a)(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). The Corporate Director's

Guidebook acknowledges that this is the universally accepted practice:
It is generally recognized that the board of directors is not expected to
operate the business. Even under statutes providing that the business
and affairs shall be "managed" by the board of directors, it is recognized
that actual operation is a function of management. The responsibility of
the board is limited to overseeing such operation.
CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1595, 1603 (1978).
Similarly, the Business Roundtable Statement notes: "It is plainly impossible for a
board composed partly of outsiders, that is partly of persons who are not fulltime
employees, to conduct . . . day-to-day [corporate] affairs."

STATEMENT OF THE

BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 2094 (1983) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE].
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rectors are collectively the managers of the company, they are
not expected to interfere individually in the actual conduct of its
affairs. To do so would disturb the authority of the officers and
destroy their individual responsibility, without which no proper
discipline is possible."' 2 5 Under this standard, the outside director could focus all of his attention upon broad policy issues and
confidently delegate powers of day-to-day management to the
corporate officers.
Recent trends, however, portend the eradication of this exceedingly relaxed supervisory role and dictate that the outside
director assume what is best described as a "quasi-managerial"
role in corporate governance. The primary characteristic of this
revision is an expansion of the director's province to include duties not traditionally assumed by the corporate board.2 6 Among
the most significant of these new obligations is that of overseeing
corporate compliance with applicable laws.2 7 This new responsibility best illustrates the concept of the director as a quasi-manager, a role in which the board member, though not responsible
for day-to-day management of the corporation, does play an integral role in overseeing corporate conduct generally. To fulfill
this obligation, the director will be required to verify corporate
financial reports and monitor the entity's legal compliance
through extensive use of board committees.2 s

II.

THE DIRECTOR'S STANDARD OF CARE IN MONITORING LEGAL

COMPLIANCE

In carrying out the duties of his office, the director is
deemed to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
and is charged with a duty of reasonable care in overseeing legal
compliance. 29 Generally, the standard of care imposed upon the
director in fulfilling his responsibilities to the corporation is
framed in terms of what "an ordinarily prudent man in a like po25 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). William Cary, a former
chairman of the SEC and frequent commentator in the area of corporate law, concludes that the prevailing low standard of care imposed upon the corporate director in performing his duties is historically traceable to Judge Hand's decision in
Barnes. Cary & Harris, supra note 8, at 62.
26 See generally Hahn & Manzoni, supra note 1 (outlining evolving role of outside
director).
27 See Small, supra note 2, at 1374.
28 See Hahn & Manzoni, supra note 1, at 592-93.
29 See W. KNEPPER, supra note 15, §§ 1.04, 1.06, 5.03.
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sition would use under such circumstances. '3 0 Defining the director's duty of care in such general terms allows for divergent
results in particular cases since the standard must, to some extent, be clarified by injection of a judge or jury's views on the
appropriate level of board activity in corporate governance.3
The recasting of the director as a quasi-manager creates a host of
unique problems in determining when the individual director has
diligently fulfilled his obligations to the corporation. A clear consequence of this redefinition is that the "prudent" director may
be required to demonstrate active participation in supervising
many realms of corporate activity which have traditionally been
entrusted exclusively to the corporate officers. Particularly, with
regard to the director's new duty to monitor corporate legal compliance, myriad administrative regulations and statutes applicable
to corporations of any3 2significant size evidence the overwhelming
nature of such a task.
One principal difficulty for the director in overseeing corporate compliance with relevant laws arises from the ill-defined nature of this task. Because the director only recently has been
delegated expanded responsibilities in monitoring corporate
legal compliance, there is little legal precedent to guide the
board member in determining what constitutes diligent oversight
of corporate activity.3 3 While it is clearly in the interest of the
director that corporate compliance programs are implemented in
areas such as antitrust and pollution control, 4 he may run a
30 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1982). The Model Act sets forth the
following standard for director care:
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest
of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent man in a
like position would use under similar circumstances.
Id. Section 35 of the Act has been a basis for some state statutes. W. KNEPPER, supra
note 2, § 1.07, at 16; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982)

(same standard); Dyson, The Director'sLiability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 371 &

n. 118 (1965) (citing prevailing standard as "that care that an ordinarily prudent
man gives to his own affairs").
31 Compare Dyson, supra note 30, at 341 with Handler & Christy, Texas Corporate
Director's Standard of Care and Right to Rely, 8 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 291, 299 (1976).
32 See STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 45-46.
33 See Audit Committees: Impact on Corporate Governance, Presentation at
Hearings of the Special Committee on Audit Committees, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Chicago, May 31, 1978, quoted in Palmieri, Corporate
Responsibility and the Competent Board, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1979, at 47 [hereinafter cited as Audit Committees].
34 See Small, supra note 1, at 1360 n.35.
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greater risk of incurring liability if he serves on a committee
charged with overseeing compliance.3 5 In order to fix the parameters of his role as monitor of corporate legal compliance, the
director must, therefore, first ascertain the circumstances under
which he will be subject to legal liability for failing to implement
and maintain a corporate legal compliance system.
A second issue of critical importance in defining the director's standard of care in verifying corporate legal compliance is
the extent to which he can justifiably rely on information provided by officers, committees of the board, attorneys, and other
third parties. While the "due diligence" defense provided under
Federal securities law limits the director's right of reliance in reviewing prospectus materials to those portions deemed to be of
an expert nature, 36 such rigorous limitations on a right of reliance have not generally been imposed in state corporate law.37
35 For example, it has been suggested that a director serving on an audit committee, by virtue of his greater access to corporate financial information, will more
readily be found to have breached a duty of care in failing to detect corporate mismanagement. Hahn & Manzoni, supra note 1, at 615. One commentator has made
the following statement concerning the director's plight. While not directed specifically at the director's liability arising from corporate noncompliance with environmental standards, the quotation is nevertheless relevant:
In the past, the view was generally accepted that as long as the
[outside] director attended board meetings with some regularity and
was reasonably diligent, he could not be subject to liability for corporate
breaches of the law, in the absence of an attempt at self-enrichment or
fraud. It was commonly believed that the outside director did not need
to involve himself personally in the day-to-day business of the corporation.
Over time, however, the standard has apparently changed. The
duty of an outside director to be informed about the corporation's activities, and to intervene when necessary, is simply not clearly established
in case law. This places the director in a precarious position. On the
one hand, if he does not keep well informed about the general business
of the corporation, he may be held not to have exercised reasonable
care. On the other hand, he may incur greater liability for having some
general knowledge at all.
Audit Committees, supra note 33, at 47. The issue of the director's basis for liability
with regard to corporate violations of law is highlighted in the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984).
36 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1982).
37 See W. KNEPPER, supra note 15, §§ 1.12-1.15; see also Ruder, Satisfaction of Director's Duties by Reliance on Others, in PREVENTING DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAW, 1976 P.L.I. CORPORATE AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
No. 222 (1976). For cases supporting a right of reliance on the part of the director,
see Dresser v. Bates, 250 F. 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1918), modified, 251 U.S. 524 (1920);
Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. App. 179, 50 N.E. 2d 602 (1943); Newton v.
Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 516, 582 P.2d 1136, 1144-45 (1978); Epstein v.
Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969, 980-81 (1939).
Although the director generally enjoys a right of reliance, the case of FDIC v.
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The Model Business CorporationAct reaffirms this trend by providing for an extended right of reliance by the director in fulfilling
his duties to the corporation. 8
The standard of care which the courts presently apply was
enunciated over twenty years ago in the landmark decision of
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 9 In Graham, the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that the directors of that company were not liable for failing to prevent antitrust violations by
corporate employees. 40 With regard to directors' obligations in
monitoring legal compliance, the Graham decision was significant
in two respects. First, the court held that in the absence of actual
or constructive knowledge of wrongdoing by employees, the directors were under no obligation "to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
Lauterbach, 626 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1980), suggests at least one limiting principle
on this right. The FDIC sued three directors of the American City Bank and Trust
Co. on notes payable to that institution. FDIC, 626 F.2d at 1329. The directors
asserted that they were induced to execute the notes by the misrepresentations of
the bank's officers. Id. at 1330. In rejecting this defense and granting a motion for
summary judgment, the court observed the following:
A corporate officer may not claim total ignorance of the corporation's
affairs, particularly those matters fairly disclosed by the directors' meetings and those corporate records to which directors had access. This is
not to say that a director may not plead and prove fraud against his own
corporation and its officers, but rather that a director's access to corporate information and his duty to maintain some minimal degree of familiarity with corporate affairs are factors which must be considered in
determining whether reliance on a representation was justifiable.
Id. at 1334 (citations deleted); accord Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 438, 50
A. 120, 143 (Ch. 1902); see also State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62 Hawaii 222,
231-38, 615 P.2d 730, 736-40 (1980) (individual serving as accommodation president and treasurer of corporation personally liable for corporation's violations of
environmental laws despite minimal participation in corporate activity); Fowler v.
Elm Creek State Bank, 198 Neb. 631, 638, 254 N.W.2d 415, 419 (1977) ("directors
may not delegate their responsibility and are not excused from liability because
they committed some of their duties to an executive committee or to the directors
of a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation"). But cf. Newton v. Hornblower,
224 Kan. 506, 518, 582 P.2d 1136, 1144 (1978) (director not estopped from bringing derivative action against fellow board members; court noted that "[p]laintiff
was not actively engaged in the management of the business having relied on the
defendants to do so").
With regard to the reliance on counsel as a defense in corporate and securities
cases, see Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counselas a Defense in Corporateand
Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 147 (1976) (reliance on counsel to prove good faith
or due care relevant only to advice on issue of law, made after full disclosure and
carefully followed).
38 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1982).
39 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
40 Id. at 86, 188 A.2d at 131.
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have no reason to suspect exists. '"' Second, the court recognized
the right of the director to rely upon subordinates in concluding
that the corporation is operating in conformity with applicable
laws. 42 Therefore, a director would not be held liable for failing
to prevent corporate violations of law unless he knows or has rea43
son to believe that wrongdoing may exist.
Although Graham is still the prevailing law, there are many
indications that this long-standing rule is presently being challenged: The Graham decision has been roundly criticized by proponents of corporate reform. 4 For example, after reviewing the
requirement of notice as a prerequisite to the installation of a
compliance program, one commentator concluded the following:
[T]he nature of corporate misconduct has changed significantly. We are no longer concerned solely with the absconding
cashier, but rather with the conscientious vice president who
fixes prices. With this rise of "regulatory" offenses, the idea of
"tell tale clues" becomes an ineffectual legal technique. Its
original premise was that signs of untrustworthiness would
alert the diligent director before the impending crime. That
premise does not apply to the problem of managerial
Id., 188 A.2d at 130.
42 The court noted: "[I]t appears that directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong." Id.
43 STATEMENT OF THE BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 129; see Briggs v.
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 162-63 (1891); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149,
1163 (D. Kan. 1974), afd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); FDIC v. Boone, 361 F.
Supp. 133, 166 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Ferris v. Polycast Tech. Corp., 180 Conn. 199,
207, 429 A.2d 850, 853 (1980); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 532-40,
582 P.2d 1136, 1444-45 (1978).
The requirement of actual or constructive knowledge, however, may be eroding. The Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned the imposition of
criminal liability on corporate executives for violations of the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act even when such persons have no knowledge of the employees'
wrongdoing. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). In justifying such liability, the Court noted
the following in Park:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible
corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect
of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of
the public that supports them.
Park, 421 U.S. at 672. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has recently found such reasoning applicable to corporate officers' liability for permitting corporate pollution
violations. State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62 Hawaii 222, 238-42, 615 P.2d
730, 738-39 (1980).
44 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1185-86.
41
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overzealousness.4t

Attacks on Graham have come recently from other quarters as well.
The 1980 SEC Staff Report on Corporate Accountability dismisses
Graham as a decision which would encourage indolence on the part
of directors in monitoring corporate activity. 46 The prestigious
American Law Institute's proposed Restatement on corporate governance 47 is also critical of Graham, concluding that, with respect to law
compliance programs, the decision implies "a passive role for the
board."' 48 Indeed, one commentary has noted that in view of the fact
45 Id.
46 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH
CONG. 2D SESS.,

SEC

STAFF REPORT, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY

666 (Comm.

Print 1980).
47 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
48 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984);

comment to § 4.01(b) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984). Section 4.01, delineating the officer's and director's duty of care and the business judgment rule, states the
following:
§ 4.01. Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment
Rule
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform
his functions in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation and otherwise consistent with the
principles of § 2.01, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person
would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under
similar circumstances.
(b) The duty of care standard set forth in Subsection (a) includes
the obligation of a director or officer to make reasonable inquiry in appropriate circumstances.
(c)(1) In performing his duty and functions, a director or officer is
entitled to rely on other directors or officers, employees, experts, other
persons, or committees of the board in accordance with § § 4.02-.03. (2)
The board may delegate to directors, officers, employees, experts, other
persons, or committees of the board the function of identifying matters
requiring the attention of the board, and a director, when acting in accordance with the standards set forth in §§ 4.02-.03, is entitled to rely
on the decisions, judgments, or performance of such persons or committees.
(d) A director or officer does not violate his duty under this Section with respect to the consequences of a business judgment if he:
(1) was informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent he reasonably believed to be appropriate
under the circumstances;
(2) was not interested. . . in the subject of the business judgment and made the judgment in good faith; and
(3) had a rational basis for believing that the business judgment was in the best interests of the corporation.
(e) A director or officer who is subject to liability because of the
breach of a duty under this Section will be held liable for damage suf-
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"that the expected role of a director has grown to include the installation of legal compliance systems," the factual setting of Graham
might presently result in a holding that the directors had breached
their duty of care.4 9
The ALI's proposed Restatement clearly indicates that a change
may be imminent. The first draft met with strong opposition from
the business community.50 The central criticism concerned the Restatement's formulation of the director's duties and standard of care:
many noted that it departs markedly from current law as reflected in
Graham and would result in significantly greater exposure for the
board member. 5 Because of the widespread influence which the
fered by his corporation only if the breach of a duty was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by the corporation.
Id. § 4.01.
The third draft of the proposed Restatement is somewhat unclear on the issue of
whether a director can be held liable for corporate violations of law without actual
or constructive notice of wrongdoing. Id. § 4.01(b) comment c. As noted in the
text, the third draft rejects the "passive" role for directors set down in Graham. Id.
comment to § 4.01 (b). However, the third draft has discarded a hypothetical illustration contained in the first draft, which concluded that directors could breach the
duty of care in failing to detect antitrust violations even though the corporation had
no prior history of antitrust violations. See generally PRINCIPLES Or CORPORATE GovERNANCE

AND

STRUCTURE:

RESTATEMENT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

comment

to

§ 4.01(b), illustration 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) ("[M]embers of X's board knew,
or should have known, that companies with similar extensive distribution systems
for consumer products had been reporting significant antitrust problems."). The
third draft, in defining the director's duty of care under § 4.01, also eliminated
specific statutory reference toothe director's obligations with regard to law compliance programs and ensuring corporate compliance to the law. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.01 (b),(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1984).
49 STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 129; cf. Monsen v.
Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 804 (3d Cir. 1978) (In action under
section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, "a director may not be found liable unless
he has culpably participated in the controlled person's unlawful activity.").
50 See Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov-Dec
1982, at 35, reprinted in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at
A-5 app.; Battle Over the Board, DUNS Bus. MONTHLY, Aug. 1983, at 53.
51 STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 44. The Business
Roundtable's publication frequently referred to in this work was a response to the
first draft on corporate governance forthcoming from the ALl-PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). Despite the revisions contained in the third draft, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1984), various criticisms leveled by the Business Roundtable against the first
draft's statements concerning the director's standard of care still may be applicable
to the third draft. Critics charge that, while a restatement is traditionally viewed as
a codification of existing law, the first draft on principles of corporate governance
actually reflects a departure from current law in many areas. Andrews, supra note
50.
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ALI restatements traditionally have had in American jurisprudence, 52 the new, more stringent standards which it suggests are potentially of great significance. Moreover, corporations themselves
have begun to acknowledge a higher standard of care for the director, including his affirmative duty to implement and maintain a cor53
porate legal compliance system. The Corporate Director's Guidebook,
based on a survey analysis of current corporate practices, evidences
this new recognition of legal monitoring as a core function of the
directorial office:
The individual should (i) become familiar with the role of the
corporation's inside and outside auditors and regular corporate counsel in regards to matters of internal control and legal
compliance, respectively, and (ii) inquire as to the corporation's policies and procedures regarding conflicts of interest
and legal compliance, and the role of regular corporate counsel in monitoring and advising with respect to such policies
and procedures.5 4
Based upon the foregoing review of legal literature, the noted
influence of the restatements in shaping American law, and the
evolution of the director's role as monitor of legal compliance, it is
reasonable to expect that future case law may reflect a departure
from the Graham notice requirement and may recognize an affirmative directorial obligation to implement law compliance programs.
Such a development would be inequitable and unfortunate if it imposed upon the board of directors a responsibility to ensure corporate legal compliance in every sector of the business entity's activity.
As the Business Roundtable noted in its review of the ALI
proposals:
Of course, directors must be concerned about law compliance.
One commentator notes with regard to the place of the restatements in American law:
52

The restatements have had wide acceptance, often being cited as authoritative definitions of the law. No restatement by the ALI can be
taken lightly, therefore, for it carries an authority close to that of actual
court decisions. It is quite possible in fact, that in the disposition of
cases judges may begin to cite the new governance proposals even in
their present tentative formulation, for these are documents in detail
and often presented in what is intended to be their final approved form
in the draft report.
Andrews, supra note 50, at 35.
53 The revised edition of the Corporate Director's Guidebook was prepared by the
Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association, and published in the ABA law journal of that
section. 33 Bus. LAw. 1591 (1978). Its purpose is "to assist the corporate director
in performing his duties." Id. at 1595.
54 Id. at 1603.
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But unless that concern is focused in a specific area by a particular event, there is no way that a director of a major corporation can hope to "monitor" law compliance across-the-board.
A free-floating concern with law compliance in the abstract
would not be productive, would unnecessarily detract from
other more immediate concerns, and would open directors to
unfair liability for acts committed by others of which they had
neither knowledge nor notice. 5 5
III.

THE ROLE OF THE OUTSIDE DIRECTOR

Another area of concern for the director in defining diligent
oversight of corporate legality is whether the directorial standard
of care is subject to the board member's particular skills. Collateral to this question is the issue of whether the diligence required
of an inside director is greater than that expected of an outside
director. In the realm of Federal securities law, for instance, the
standard of care applied to the director in establishing the "due
diligence defense" is defined with reference to the director's rela56
tive position in the corporation and his individual expertise.
Cases outside the arena of Federal securities litigation also
demonstrate a trend towards imposing a higher standard of care
on inside directors.5 7 The distinction between inside and outside
directors is quite logical in view of the inside director's more intimate knowledge of corporate affairs, arising from regular and
systematic involvement with the business entity.5" In the early
55 STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 45; cf. PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS comment to

§ 4.01 (b) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) ("Directors could not, of course, reasonably be
expected to be concerned about unanticipated, novel law compliance problems;
similarly, they would have no reasonable basis for concern about obscure or relatively unimportant areas of law."). There is a developing body of legal literature on
structuring corporate legal compliance programs generally and environmental programs specifically. See, e.g., Committee on Envtl. Controls, StructuringCorporatePollution Compliance Programsfor Pollution Control Requirements, 35 Bus. LAw. 1459 (1980);
Hardy, The Corporate Compliance Program, in THE NEW ERA OF CORPORATE & DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY 467 (1981); Plaut & Wallum, Allied Chemical's Environmental Organization Programs, in CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 139 (1982).
56 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57 See cases cited infra note 63.
58 See infra note 61 and accompanying text. With reference to the issue of gradations of liability based upon one's status as an inside or outside director, see Hoffman, Gradationsin Liability, 27 Bus. LAw. 173 (special issue Feb. 1972). Hoffman, in
reviewing the concept of gradations of liability for directors, has observed at least
three weaknesses in such a system: (i) defining the particular areas of expertise of
the individual director, for the purposes of board delegation of duties, may be a
very complex undertaking; (ii) such gradations will promote "harmful" litigation
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United States Supreme Court decision of Bates v. Dresser,59 the
Court held a bank president liable for not detecting a bookkeeper's fraudulent transactions.6" Other directors of the bank,
not regularly engaged in the day-to-day operation of the institution, were found not to have breached their duty in failing to detect the wrongdoing. 6 The Court distinguished the conduct of
the president - noting his daily involvement in the operation of
the bank - from the actions of the less involved directors who
justifiably relied on the cashier's statement.6 2 The gradations of
liability based upon a board member's status as an inside or
outside director is likewise found in state court decisions.6 3
In the final assessment of the outside directors' standard of
care in monitoring legal compliance, the business judgment
rule 64 will afford the individual board member a certain degree of
immunity from liability for good faith errors ofjudgment in fulfilling obligations to the corporation.6 5 In order to enjoy the immuagainst specialized directors; and (iii) the gradations will continue a trend towards
fractionalization of the board and lessened board interaction. Id. at 176.
59 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
60 Id. at 530-31.
61 Id. at 530.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 652 (Iowa 1979)
("an outside director does not have the same duty or responsibility that falls upon
those who are in active charge and who dictate day-to-day policy"); Newton v.
Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 521, 582 P.2d 1136, 1144 (1978) (noting director
not "actively engaged in the management of the corporation"); Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 439, 50 A. 120, 143 (Ch. 1901) ("He was not only a director,
but he was president of the bank, and its principal executive officer, and it was
especially his duty to examine into all the matters and things which have been heretofore referred to ....
); see also 3A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1096.1 (Supp. 1984). Courts have articulated a similar
"sliding scale of care" in differentiating the liability of a trustee from that of a corporate director. Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398, 401
(1964); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 21 (1872).
64 The business judgment rule is a policy decision by the courts not to "second
guess" corporate decisions unless they are fraudulent or violative of the corporation's charter. As the court in Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157,
142 A. 654 (1928), noted:
[Ilt is not [the courts'] function to resolve for corporations questions of
policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass
upon such questions and theirjudgment unless shown to be tainted with
fraud is accepted as final. Thejudgment of the directors of corporations
enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith and
was designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they
serve.
Id. at 659.
65 Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor but Chartered Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947, 958 (1980).
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nity of the business judgment rule, a director must demonstrate
that his actions were taken in good faith, that a reasonable basis
existed for a belief that the actions were lawful and in pursuit of
legitimate corporate purposes, and that the actions were honestly
undertaken after appropriate consideration of those factors believed to be material to the decision. 66 Nevertheless, the business
66 Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 24, at 1604. The business judgment
rule is not applicable if the director has a conflict of interest or has violated the duty
of loyalty. Id. For the Restatement version of the business judgment rule, see supra
note 48.
The Business Roundtable specifically rejects the conclusion that, under current
law, the protection that the business judgment rule affords directors is premised
upon a showing that the director's decision has a "rational basis." STATEMENT OF
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 49. But see Arsht, The BusinessJudgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 126 (1979) ("In conducting its own analysis of
the reasonableness of the directors' business judgment, the court does not attempt
to decide whether it agrees with the directors' judgment. The court determines
only whether there is a reasonable basis for the directors' decision."); Sparks, Recent
Developments in Substantive Business Judgment Rule, 61 N.C.L. REV. 534, 537 (1983)
("The next element for the business judgment rule to apply is the requirement,
which some argue should not be included as part of the business judgment rule
formulation, that the directors have a rational basis for the decision.").
With regard to the protection afforded directors in the specific context of corporate law compliance, the ALI Draft notes the following:
Of course, whether there has been a conscious decision or inexcusable inattentiveness may, at times, not be readily discernible and may
present close evidentiary questions. For example, in what might appear
at first glance to be an "omission" situation, the directors might actually
have carefully marshaled relevant information, appraised the risks, and
then decided (with a rational basis) not to install a particular antitrust
compliance program or a computer security program. In that event, assuming that they acted in good faith and were disinterested, the safe
harbor provided by the business judgment rule would be available. Similarly, informed directors might have concluded that the effectiveness of
a particular procedure or program need only be reviewed once every
two years, and if their decision had a rational basis, the safe harbor provided by § 4.01 (d) would again be available. It would, of course, also be
possible to delegate authority for designing and overseeing the effectiveness of a particular program or procedure to corporate officers or a
committee of the board, and the decision to delegate authority would, if
made in accordance with § 4.01(d)(1)-(3), be protected by the business
judgment rule.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS com-

ment to § 4.01(d) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984). Thus, the third draft on corporate
governance would extend the business judgment rule to protect a conscious directorial decision to not install corporate compliance programs if the section 4.01 conditions for application of the rule were otherwise met. The applicability of the
business judgment rule to the director's decision to not install a compliance program should be compared with comments accompanying ALI Tentative Draft No.
1:
Basic to an understanding of § 4.01 (d)'s business judgment rule is a
recognition that the safe harbor it provides for a deliberative decision

1985]

DIRECTOR AS LEGAL MONITOR

611

judgment rule is not determinative when considering the critical
issues of the extent and degree of action which must be undertaken by a board director to "diligently" conclude that the corporation has .complied with relevant environmental laws.67
may be inapplicable to many of the functions covered by § 4.01(a). A
deliberative decision is a decision on which a director or officer has attentively and directly focused and as to which judgment has, in fact,
been exercised. If, for example, directors fail in their obligations to
"monitor the conduct of the corporation's business" (§ 3.02(a)(2)), or
to be "reasonably concerned with the existence and effectiveness of
monitoring programs" (§ 4.01(b)), by not even considering the need for
an appropriate loss prevention program, and an executive absconds
with corporate funds, business judgment rule protection would be manifestly undesirable ...
Of course, at times, the conceptual gap between "deliberative decisions" and monitoring and information gathering functions may present
close questions or wholly disappear. In the illustrations above, for example, the directors might have carefully marshaled relevant information and made reasonable inquiry, appraised the risks, and then decided
unreasonably (but with a rational basis) not to install the loss prevention
program or not to replace a principal senior executive who should have
been replaced. In that event (in the absence of bad faith or a disabling
conflict of interest), the safe harbor provided by § 4.01(d) would be
available. In this context, it is informed and attentive deliberation that
§ 4.01 (d) is designed to encourage. Similarly, after reasonable inquiry,
informed directors might have concluded that the effectiveness of a loss
prevention program need only be reviewed once every two years (subject to periodic updating of the board by the general counsel), and if
their decision had a rational basis, the safe harbor provided by § 4.01
would again be available.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).

The Business Roundtable was very critical of the rendition of the business
judgment rule set forth in the ALI's first draft on corporate governance. See STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 24, at 48-49. The Roundtable
strongly objected to the " 'Deliberative Decision' " aspect of the business judgment
rule:
In fact, one of the most important aspects of the "business judgment" a
director brings to his position is a sense of what is important and what is
not-including what needs to be "monitored" and what does not.
These critical decisions-which are often made without any formal "deliberation"-should be protected by the business judgment rule.
Id. at 48.
67 See M. SCHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 94 (1976); Sparks, supra note 66, at
535. The scope of protection afforded by the rule is at best uncertain, because it is
subject to a certain amount ofjudicial discretion in the determination of its applicability to any given factual situation. SCHAEr-rLER, supra, at 94-95.
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THE DIRECTOR AND CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
COMPLIANCE

The complexity and breadth of the Federal environmental
scheme presents the outside director with a serious dilemma in
his attempt to monitor corporate compliance with environmental
law. A few of the major Federal statutory sections potentially applicable to the corporation include the Clean Water Act,6 8 the
Clean Air Act, 69 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act.7" As of 1978,
the Clean Water Act alone composed five titles in the United
States Code, including approximately one hundred pages of legislation. 7 1 Furthermore, the corporation also will frequently be
subject to environmental protection legislation on the state level.
With regard to Federal environmental legislation generally,
one scholar has observed that: (i) the complexity and specificity
of the scheme renders total compliance an impossibility; (ii) "violations breed violations;" (iii) the federal system is one of discretionary-based prosecution; and (iv) the civil and criminal
sanctions attached to many of the statutes are potentially draconian. 7 2 These characteristics of the Federal environmental
scheme exacerbate the plight of the corporate director in his attempt to comply with a system of discretionary-based administrative law. 73 The director is subjected to extensive liability in
overseeing the corporation's legal adherence to a system, the requirements of which are not only difficult to ascertain, but are
74
also inflexible in nature, and potentially impossible to satisfy.
An essential problem for the outside director is the interface
of this complex environmental scheme with his vaguely defined
role as monitor of corporate activity. Although the parameters of
the director's duties as corporate legal monitor are as yet not delineated clearly, 75 certain conclusions nevertheless can be drawn
concerning the most advisable actions to be undertaken by the
outside director in overseeing corporate adherence to environmental protection legislation. The individual serving as an
68 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).

69 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
71 McMahon, Clean WaterAct, in P.L.I. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 150, at 227
(1978).

72 Committee on Envtl. Controls, supra note 55, at 1467-69 (statement of Wil-

liam H. Anderson).
73 See T. SMITH, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES-DILEMMAS FOR THE REGULATED, reprintedin ABA ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT; SELECTED READINGS (1979).

74 Id.

75 See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
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outside director on a corporate board will be well advised to implement and oversee adherence to an environmental compliance
program.76 Implementation and supervision of such a program
probably will comport with contemporary standards of "diligence." In regularly overseeing such an environmental compliance program, the director will be legally justified in placing
reasonable reliance upon the reports of third parties including
management, corporate committees, and attorneys. 7 Thus, the
director who can demonstrate periodic and careful review of environmental compliance reports provided by corporate counsel,
a corporate committee, or management should find a safe harbor
from derivative liability. 78 Ironically, failure of a program to pro-

duce corporate compliance with applicable environmental legislation may result in a greater likelihood of an EPA enforcement
action. 79 Even if there is a failure to detect corporate infractions
of relevant environmental legislation by virtue of defects in the
compliance program, however, the director may nevertheless be
sheltered from liability under the business judgment rule.80
Requiring a director to implement and oversee an environmental law program may seem a reasonable requirement for cultivating ethical behavior in the corporate realm, particularly in
view of the fact that the director is granted a broad right of reliance on third party information in overseeing compliance. However, the onerous nature of such a task becomes clear given the
fact that the director will be required to implement and oversee
such programs in numerous areas such as antitrust, securities
regulation, and employment discrimination. 8 ' Nevertheless, as
the law is evolving, the outside director may have an obligation
to ensure that a comprehensive corporate pollution compliance
program is instituted and to regularly substantiate, through corporate committees or otherwise, that the business entity is adhering to applicable environmental laws. 82
76 See Committee on Envtl. Controls, supra note 55, at 1459.
77 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979); see also Comment, Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 70 YALE L.J. 978 (1961). The director's reliance is only justified if
done in good faith and with due care. See W. KNEPPER, sUpra note 22, § 1.14; PRINANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (c) (1)
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984).
78 See Hahn & Manzoni, supra note 1, at 615.
79 Committee on Envtl. Controls, supra note 55, at 1465.
80 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
comment to § 4.01(b), illustration 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984).
81 See supra text accompanying note 54.
82 See CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 24, at 1610.
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CONCLUSIONS ON THE OUTSIDE DIRECTOR'S ROLE

Defining the legal parameters of the outside director's personal liability for corporate violations of environmental law epitomizes the intense struggles now being waged concerning the
future of corporate governance.8 3 As a result of the intersection
of environmental protection legislation and securities regulation,
the outside director may now stand in a position of enhanced exposure. 84 Whether this is a desirable result is an issue which both
the courts and the commentators must now confront and
evaluate.
The outside director can serve as a focal point for conflicting
ideas in the realm of American corporate law, economic theory,
and social policy. Initially, the question must be raised as to
whether the director should assume a quasi-managerial role in
corporate governance. Although one may be appalled at the alleged low level of social responsibility manifested by the American corporation in this century,8 5 it is a most dangerous
precedent to transform the outside director into a conduit for the
conveyance of selected social values into this traditional business
entity. 8 6 The outside director represents the potential for expanding and diversifying information implemented in the mana83 See generally Battle Over the Board, DUNS Bus. MONTHLY, Aug. 1983, at 53.

84 The appropriateness of the outside director's present position of vulnerability
under existing Federal securities law is a question which transcends the confines of
new reporting requirements engendered by environmental legislation. One commentator has noted the following:
Section 11 is truly awesome for the outside director. He must independently verify, to some undetermined but significant extent, a document covering the entire business, legal, financial, production and
marketing picture of the corporation.
The document is prepared by lawyers, who usually are not under a
statutory duty to reasonably investigate and who specifically eschew any
duty to do so. It is scary to note that neither the legal profession nor the

SEC has yet established a procedure telling the outside director exactly
what he is to do. But one point is clear: he is to independently check
the product of the operating management in order to protect investors.

This is unnatural and hence awkward at best.
Shipman, The Outside Director Distinguishedfrom the Inside Director, reprinted in P.L.I.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 268, at 277 (1979).
85

See C.

STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE

BEHAVIOR xi-xii (1975).
86 The recent trend of targeting directors for corporate wrongs may be a desirable trend, but only in those extreme situations where directors fail to assess managerial performance or exhibit gross indifference in responding to indicia of
corporate mismanagement. Conrad, supra note 16, at 917. In defining what would
constitute such actionable negligence, the director should not be held liable for
failure to be actively involved in managerial decisions. See id.
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gerial decision-making process. Increasing the legal liabilities
attendant upon the outside director by burdening him with unrealistic monitoring functions will discourage individuals from
board service and thus eliminate the unique values which the outsider's presence on the corporate board can provide. Furthermore, such expansions of the director's duties will prove to be
economically inefficient, requiring excessive transaction costs
and providing little progress towards
the goal of compensating
87
those injured by mismanagement.
In their haste to check the supposed excess power wielded
by corporate management, some proponents of the corporate
governance movement threaten to create a problem of equal repugnance by imposing unworkable managerial duties on the
outside director. Terminating the traditional widespread externalization of corporate costs in the form of environmental pollution is a most worthy goal for any society. In seeking to reach
such ends, however, American jurisprudence must maintain due
respect for the value of the outside director in corporate life and
not discourage the service of many in such a capacity by the imposition of unrealistic responsibilities and excessive personal
liability.8 8
Id. at 907-12.
See Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872), wherein the court states:
But it is evident that gentlemen elected by the stockholders from their
own body ought not to be judged by the same strict standard as the
agent or trustee of a private estate. Were such a rule applied, no gentlemen of character and responsibility would be found willing to accept
such places.
Id. at 21.
87
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